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Abstract— Wireless networks are more and more common in 
current communications networks. Nevertheless, wireless 
communications entail a big concern: security. The use of 
X.509v3 certificates to carry out authentication tasks is an 
approach to improve security. These certificates are usually 
employed with the RSA algorithm. Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) is a cryptographic technique eminently suited for small 
devices, like those used in wireless communications, and is 
gaining momentum. The main advantage of ECC versus RSA is 
that for the same level of security it requires a much sorter key 
length. The purpose of this work is to design and implement a 
free open-source Certification Authority able to issue X.509v3 
certificates using ECC. This research is an implementation study 
on free open-source tools to issue digital certificates using ECC. 
Moreover, it contributes to the development of free open-source 
tools for network security based on ECC. The result of this 
research may assist organizations to increase their security level 
in wireless devices and networks, in a costless way, by including 
authentication techniques based on ECC digital certificates.  
Keywords- digital certificates; elliptic curve cryptography; 
security; wireless communications. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have suffered a dramatic increase in 
recent years. Wireless technology is more and more present in 
our society and millions of wireless equipment are sold every 
year. However, one of the major concerns about wireless 
communications is security. RSA is the most common method 
employed in public key cryptography, for instance in X.509 
digital certificates. These certificates are oriented to verify the 
identity of a person or an entity. However, new concerns are 
rising about the security of 1024-bit RSA [1]. 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an innovative 
cryptographic technique. Its security resides in the same 
problem as RSA or Diffie-Hellman algorithms, but instead of 
using integers as symbols of the alphabet to be ciphered, it uses 
points in a mathematical object called elliptic curve. The real 
ECC potential is that, with a much smaller key length, it 
achieves the same security level as other proposals. Therefore, 
ECC presents some key attributes truly important in scenarios 
where the following resources are limited: processing power, 
storage space, bandwidth and power consumption [2] [3]. 
There are even some organizations working towards ECC 
standardization (IEEE, IETF, ISO, etc.), and leading enterprises 
developing new ECC products. Nevertheless, to favor the 
widespread use of ECC it is also essential promoting free open-
source ECC tools. 
In this paper we introduce a free open-source Certification 
Authority (CA) for ECC X.509v3 digital certificates. The CA 
we propose is able to generate its own root certificate and to 
issue clients’ certificates. We also develop the software a client 
requires to create a certificate request. This certificate request is 
the one that the CA should sign after some verification steps. 
The tool we propose is mainly oriented to environments with 
limited resources. As it will be shown in next sections, its 
advantages are clearly noticeable. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, 
we give a brief overview about Elliptic Curve Cryptography, 
and the ECC mechanisms we use for the new X.509v3 ECC 
digital certificates. In section 3, we explain the design of the 
certification tool. In section 4, we describe the ECC CA 
working scenario. Section 5 shows and discusses the 
experimental implementation. The paper ends with the most 
important concluding remarks in section 6. 
II. OVERVIEW OF ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY
Public key (asymmetric) cryptography uses two keys (a 
private key and a public key), differing from private key 
(symmetric) cryptography, where there must be a shared secret 
key. Elliptic Curve Cryptography was discovered in 1985 by V. 
Miller [4] as an alternative method for public key 
cryptography. At that time, it was very difficult to perform the 
necessary calculations. With time, implementations were much 
more efficient, what allowed the performance of elliptic curve 
mathematics to take the same amount of time as 
implementations of integer factoring schemes for the same 
number of bits. This, in its turn, implies a reduction in cost, 
size, and processing time because elliptic curves require fewer 
bits for the same security level. 
An elliptic curve is described by a cube equation, similar to 
those used to calculate an elliptic circumference. Usually, the 
cube equation of an elliptic curve is indicated by (1), where a,
b, c, d, and e are usually real numbers that comply with some 
condition. Then, the elliptic curve is defined by the points (x,y)
that satisfy this equation. The addition operation can be defined 
for an elliptic curve, together with the element point at infinity 
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0. This addition operation fulfills the associative and 
commutative properties. 
 edxcxxbyaxyy +++=++ 232 . (1) 
Elliptic curves used in cryptography are defined over two 
types of finite fields: fields of odd characteristics (
pF , where p
is a large prime number), and fields of characteristics two 
( mF2 ). For the sake of simplicity we focus on pF . Observe that 
the field 
pF  only employs the numbers from 0 to (p-1), and all 
computations end by taking the remainder on division by p. In 
particular, cryptography is interested in elliptic curve groups 
over 
pF . If we chose two positive integers, a and b, smaller 
than p such that (2) is true, then ),( baE p denotes the elliptic 
curve group in 
pF , whose elements (x,y) are pairs of positive 
integers smaller than p that satisfy the elliptic curve equation 
(3). 
 0)(mod274 23 ≠+ pba . (2) 
 )(mod)(mod 32 pbaxxpy ++= . (3) 
To create a crypto system using elliptic curves is necessary 
to find a difficult problem such factorizing the product of two 
prime numbers or calculating a discrete logarithm. Consider the 
equation GkP ⋅= , where P and G are points belonging to 
),( baE p , and k is smaller than p. It is quite easy to assess P
given k and G, but it is very complex to calculate k given P and 
G. This is called the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP). In fact, the G point is called the generator 
point. The criterion to select G is as follows: the smallest value 
of n such that 0Gn =⋅  must be a large prime number. Most of 
the elliptic curve cryptographic methods are related to the 
discrete logarithm schemes, which were originally formulated 
for usual modular arithmetic. 
In order to use ECC, all parties must agree on all the 
elements defining the elliptic curve, that is, all parties should 
know the domain parameters. For the field 
pF , the domain 
parameters are: the prime number p, constants a and b, the 
generator point G, and the integer n. The generation of these 
domain parameters is not straightforward. Several standards 
bodies publish domain parameters of elliptic curves [5] [6] [7]. 
Next, we briefly explain the two ECC algorithms that we 
use in this work to generate the ECC X.509v3 certificates: 
ECDSA to sign a digital certificate, and ECIES to generate the 
public key included in a digital certificate. 
A. ECIES 
The Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES), 
also known as Elliptic Curve Augmented Encryption Scheme 
or Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme, is an ECC public-key 
encryption technique. ECIES is based on the Diffie-Hellman 
method. Let us explain briefly how it works [6] [7] [8]. 
First, one entity (e.g. A) should establish what key 
derivation function (KDF) to use (e.g. ANSI-X9.63-KDF with 
SHA-1 option [7], IKEv2-KDF [10] or TLS-KDF [11]). A 
KDF is used to derive keying data from a shared secret octet 
string. Entity A should also select: the MAC (Message 
Authentication Code) scheme (e.g., HMAC-SHA-1-160 with 
160-bit keys, HMAC-SHA-1-80 with 160-bit keys, etc.), the 
symmetric encryption scheme (e.g. AES), and any option 
involved in them. A should decide on whether to use the 
standard elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman primitive or the elliptic 
curve cofactor Diffie-Hellman. In addition, A should establish 
the elliptic curve domain parameters (a, b, G, n, etc.) at the 
desired security level. Next, the other entity (e.g. B) should 
obtain in an authentic manner the selections made by A.
After that, A should set up an elliptic curve key pair 
associated with the elliptic curve domain parameters 
determined during the setup procedure. Let’s call KPA to the A’s 
public key and KpA to the A’s private key. KpA is an integer 
chosen randomly in the range [1, n-1]. KPA is calculated as 
indicated by expression (4): 
 
GKK pAPA ⋅=
. (4) 
Then, entity B should obtain in an authentic way the elliptic 
curve public key selected by A, i.e. KPA. From now on, B (A)
should encrypt (decrypt) messages using the keys and 
parameters established previously. For instance, if B wants to 
send a ciphered message to A, then B does the following 
actions: 
• B generates a random number r ∈ [1, n-1] and assesses 
GrR ⋅= .
• B obtains a shared secret PAS KrK ⋅= . Note that R and 
KS are points in the elliptic curve. 
• B uses the KDF to derive a symmetric encryption and 
MAC keys, KE and KM respectively. 
• B ciphers the message using KE and the symmetric 
encryption scheme selected during the setup phase. 
• B computes the tag of the ciphered message using KM.
• The decryption process is straightforward knowing the 
Diffie-Hellman procedure. 
In this work, we use ECIES to generate the public key of an 
entity, which can be used for ciphering in later services. The 
legitimacy of this public key is guaranteed by the digital 
certificate ECC X.509v3 that our proposed Certification 
Authority issues. The ECIES parameters that we have selected 
in our implementation are shown below in Table 1. 
B. ECDSA 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a 
variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) that operates 
with elliptic curves. Signature schemes are designed to be used 
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when an entity A wants to send a message M to an entity B in 
an authenticated way, and B wants to verify the authenticity of 
M. ECDSA acts as follows [7] [8] [12]. 
First, an entity A should select what hash function to use 
(e.g. SHA). Moreover, A should establish the curve domain 
parameters (a, b, G, n, etc.) at the desire security level. Entity B
should get in an authentic manner the selections made by A.
Next, A and B should perform a key deployment procedure 
to be prepared to use ECDSA. A should set up an elliptic curve 
key pair associated with the elliptic curve domain parameters 
agreed on the setup procedure to use with ECDSA. Let’s call 
KPA to the A’s public key, as shown in (4), and KpA to the A’s 
private key (randomly selected in [1, n-1]). B should obtain the 
elliptic curve public key selected by A, i.e. KPA.
To sign a message M, A should proceed according to the 
following steps: 
• A applies the hash function to the message, and derives 
an integer e from the obtained hash.  
• A selects a random integer k in the range [1, n-1], and 
calculates ),( AA yxGkK =⋅= .
• A assesses )(mod nxr A= .
• A calculates ))(mod(1 nrKeks pA ⋅+= − .
• The signature is the pair (r, s). 
To verify the signature, the entity B should proceed as 
follows: 
• B checks if r and s are integers, otherwise the signature 
is not valid. 
• B applies the hash function to the message, and derives 
an integer e from the obtained hash. 
• B calculates )(mod11 nseu
−
⋅=  and 
)(mod12 nsru
−
⋅= .
• B computes PAAA KuGuyxK ⋅+⋅== 21),( .
• The signature is valid if )(mod nrxA = .
In this work, the Certification Authority uses ECDSA to 
sign an ECC X.509v3 digital certificate containing an ECIES 
public key, thus verifying the authenticity of the public key and 
its owner. 
TABLE I. ELLIPTIC CURVE DOMAIN PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value 
a 0x7fffffffffffffffffffffff7fffffffffff8000000000007ffffffffffc 
b 0x6b016c3bdcf18941d0d654921475ca71a9db2fb27d1d37796185c2942c0a 
G 0x020ffa963cdca8816ccc33b8642bedf905c3d358573d3f27fbbd3b3cb9aaaf 
n 883423532389192164791648750360308884807550341691627752275345424702807307 
p 883423532389192164791648750360308885314476597252960362792450860609699839 
III. ECC CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY DESIGN
We choose Java as programming language due to its 
platform independence. After a searching phase, we leaned on 
the open source library BouncyCastle [13] to write the code. 
Next, we give details about the ECC CA design. 
Our work can be divided into three blocks: classes to create 
the CA, classes to create the certificate request by the client, 
and classes so that the CA can sign the certificate request. In 
addition, we define three classes (included in Fig. 1) that are 
shared by all blocks: 
• KeyGeneration is in charge of generating an elliptic 
curve key pair. It uses the ECIES scheme specified in 
ANSIX9.63 and IEEE P1363. 
• X509Subject takes the component of the client data, 
splits it into its minimum units, and composes it again to 
eliminate possible misspellings. 
• CertificateUtils generates .cer certificates (certificates 
signed by the CA, i.e., the identity of the user has been 
verified), and .der certificates (certificates that have not 
been signed yet, i.e. a client certificate request). 
In the first block, classes to make the CA, we define the 
class CAcertEC shown in Fig. 2. Its main task is to generate the 
X.509v3 root certificate and the PKCS#12 (Public Key 
Cryptography Standard, PKCS) with the corresponding CA’s 
private key. A root certificate is a certificate that contains the 
public key of a CA. Clients can trust a CA only if a copy of the 
CA root certificate is in its trusted root certificate store. 
Moreover, the CA public key included in the CA root 
certificate is needed to verify the validity of any certificate that 
the CA issues. PKCS is a set of standard protocols to exchange 
secure information on the Internet using a public key 
infrastructure. PKCS#12 is a standard that specifies a portable 
format for storing a user’s private key. 
In the second block, classes to create the certificate request 
by the client, we characterize the classes illustrated in Fig. 3. 
They involve the following tasks: 
• GraphicClient launches an applet that the client uses to 
fill in the data necessary for the certificate request. 
• Manager captures the applet events. 
Figure 1. Shared classes. 
KeyGeneration 
Static KeyGeneration(int): KeyPair 
X509Subject 
Static decodeX509Subject(string) : string 
CertificateUtils 
Static X509Certificate genCert  
Static createCertMaster(PublicKey, PrivateKey, string, 
int, string): X509Certificate 
Static createCertDER(PublicKey, PrivateKey, string, 
string): PKCS10CertificateRequest 
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CAcertEC 
nameCA string 
departmentCA string 
organizationCA string 
cityCA string 
countryCA string 
postalcodeCA string 
passwdCA string 
emailCA string 
caIssuer string 
sizeClave int 
monthDurationCACertificate int 
signAlgorithm string 
keyPairCA KeyPair 
caPrivKey PrivateKey 
caPubKey PublicKey 
pfxPath string 
cerPath string 
Public CAcertEC( )  
Figure 2. Classes to create the CA. 
• UserCertEC_DER generates a .der certificate (a 
certificate request). This is a certificate without a 
signature, hence, not valid yet. The .der certificate 
should be sent to the CA for signing. This class also 
generates a PKCS#12 to store the private key.
• MinimumClient takes the client .der certificate and 
sends it to the CA.
In the last block, classes so that the CA signs the certificate 
request, we create the classes included in Fig. 4. The goals of 
these classes are: 
• MinimumServer, the CA is listening, waiting for a client 
request. When a client connects to the CA, the CA 
checks if the client is authorized to demand the service. 
If the client is authorized then the CA signs the client 
certificate request using the DER2CER class. 
Afterwards, the CA returns the signed certificate (.cer), 
ready for use, back to the client. The CA keeps waiting 
for new client requests. 
• DER2CER, this class firstly edits the client certificate 
request (PKCS#10), and adds new data such as key 
length, certificate serial number, period of validity 
(valid from-to), and signature algorithm. In our case, the 
CA uses the ECDSAwithSHA-1 (Elliptic Curve Digital 
Signature Algorithm with Secure Hash Algorithm 1) to 
sign certificates. DER2CER needs to know the key 
(usually known as superkey) to access the CA secret 
key, which is located in the file server.pfx. It is 
necessary to know the CA secret key otherwise the CA 
would not be able to sign the client certificate. 
Afterwards, the client certificate (.cer) is created with 
CertificateUtils.
IV. ECC CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY PROTOCOL APPROACH
In this section we explain the general procedure to obtain an 
ECC X.509v3 certificate (see Fig. 5). First of all, the client asks 
the CA to issue a certificate (step 1). In further services, the 
client could be authenticated with this certificate, or the public 
key included in the certificate could be used for ciphering. 
Then, the CA sends its root certificate (serverCa.cer) and the 
software needed by the client to generate the certificate request 
(step 2). The client installs the CA root certificate in its trusted 
store. Although not implemented, the software could also be 
signed so that the client can trust in it. 
The client executes the software to generate a key pair and 
a certificate request (client.der) (step 3). The client sends its 
certificate request to the CA (step 4). The CA receives the 
certificate request and some information from the user to 
validate him/her. Different approaches can be taken to decide if 
a user is authorized or not to ask for an ECC X.509v3 
certificate and verify his/her identity. For instance, if this 
system were used in a pre-paid hotspot (e.g. airport, hotel, etc.), 
the user could send a code number to be validated. This code 
could be obtained when a pre-paid card is bought. In other 
environments, like a small company, the user validation could 
be done in person. 
Figure 3. Classes to generate a certificate request.  
CertificateUtils
X509Subject
UserCertEC_DER 
String name
String organization 
String city
String country 
String passwd 
String email 
X509Certificate UserCert 
KeyPair Keys 
PrivateKey PrivKey 
PublicKey PubKey
int keySize
int monthDurationUserCertificate 
String signAlgorithm 
String pfxPath 
String cerPath 
init( ): void 
Manager 
TextField text1, text2, text3, text4, text5, text6, 
text8, text9 
Jpassw 
String Name 
String Dept 
String Organization 
String City 
String Country 
String PC 
String pwd 
String email 
String pathCert 
Public Manager(TextField, TextField, TextField, 
TextField, TextField, TextField, JPassword 
Field, TextField, TextField) 
PublicactionPerformed(ActionEvent): void 
GraphicClient 
init( ): void 
KeyGeneration
CertificateUtilss
X509Subject
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DER2CER 
String cerPath 
String derPath 
String pfxCAPath 
String keyPFXCA 
String userParam 
String caParam 
String caIssue 
KeyPair keyPairCA 
PrivateKey caPrivKey 
PublicKey caPubKey 
X509Certificate caCer 
String nameCA 
String organizationCA 
String cityCA 
String countryCA 
String postalcodeCA 
String passwdCA 
String emailCA 
String name 
String department 
String organization 
String city 
String country 
String postalcode 
String email 
String passwd 
int keySize 
long nserie 
int monthDurationUserCertificate 
String signAlgorithm 
Public MinimumClient( ) 
Figure 4. Classes to sign the client certificate request. 
Figure 5. General procedure. 
If the user is authorized to demand this service, and his/her 
identity has been confirmed, the CA processes the certificate 
request, signing it with its private key and sending the final 
X.509v3 certificate (client.cer) to the client. Using this 
certificate, the client can be authenticated for later network 
services. Note that the entire process is transparent from the 
user side. 
V. ECC CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present the implementation of our free 
open-source ECC Certification Authority. The implementation 
can be downloaded from [14]. For simplicity, we follow the 
same nomenclature (step 1, step 2, etc.) than we used in the 
previous section. 
At first, the server is waiting for client requests. In our 
implementation, we assume that the client already has the 
software to generate the certification request (steps 1 and 2 in 
Fig. 5). To make the rest of the process easier, we have 
included a web page where the user can introduce some of the 
data needed for his/her certificate (e.g.: name, affiliation, etc.). 
Therefore, in the third step the client loads the web page (Fig. 
6). When the form is filled in, the client clicks the “send” 
button. At that time, the client software creates a key store 
PKCS#12, where the private ECC key is stored and the 
certificate request client.der is generated. The client 
automatically sends the client.der certificate to the Certification 
Authority (step 4 in Fig.5). 
The CA receives the certificate request client.der, the name 
of the client host, and its IP address. Received data belonging 
to client.der is shown in the screen. We assume that the client 
has proper access to the service, so the CA should only issue 
the final client certificate. Once the client.cer certificate is 
ready, the CA sends it back to the client. 
At this moment, the client has three files: client.cer,
client.der, and client.pfx. The file client.cer is the X.509v3 
ECC certificate. The file client.der is the certificate request that 
can be deleted. The file client.pfx is the key store, where the 
client’s private key is kept. These three files are located in the 
directory previously indicated in the form, in the box “path to 
store the certificate” (Fig. 6). 
In Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, we observe the details of the certificate 
(client.cer). The certificate is issued to “Paco” by the 
Certification Authority “CA4ec” and is valid from 10/12/2005 
(following the date format dd/mm/yy) to 09/05/2006. We see in 
Fig. 8 that the signature algorithm corresponds to the OID 
(Object Identifier) 1.2.840.10045.4.1. This OID matches the 
ECDSAwithSHA1 algorithm. From Fig. 8, we observe that the 
public key algorithm is ECIES, identified by the OID 
1.2.840.10045.2.1. OIDs can be checked in [15]. 
Regarding the certification path, we note from Fig. 7 and 
Fig. 9 that the certificate appears as not valid (red cross in Fig. 
9). This is due to the fact that Windows XP operating system 
does not include yet any library (or module) to use ECDSA. 
That is, it does not understand yet the algorithms ECIES or 
ECDSA. Consequently, it is not able to verify the integrity of 
the certificate. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose, design, and implement a free 
open-source Certification Authority that generates X.509v3 
certificates by using elliptic curve cryptography. We explain 
the classes needed to create the Certification Authority, the 
classes needed to create a client certificate request, and the 
classes to sign and generate the final validated client certificate. 
We also show a real implementation. With the use of this type 
of application, we aim to help to spread the use of elliptic curve 
cryptography. Our implementation is notably useful for small 
wireless devices with processing power, storage space, or 
power consumption restrictions. 
1
2
3
4
56
MinimumServer 
Static Main(args[]) : 
void
CertificateUtils
X509Subject
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Figure 6. Client web page. The user can fill in: name, surname, department, 
organization, city, country code, postal code, secret key to access his/her 
private key, email address, and the path to store the certificate. 
Figure 7. Certificate information. 
Figure 8. Details of the certificate. 
Figure 9. Certificate path. 
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